

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

INFORMATION REPORT

This Document contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States, within the meaning of Title 18, Sections 793 and 794, of the U.S. Code, as amended. Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or receipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law. The reproduction of this form is prohibited.

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

COUNTRY	Czechoslovakia	REPORT NO.	[REDACTED]	25X1A
SUBJECT	Ministry of Heavy Engineering	DATE DISTR.	26 May 1953	
		NO. OF PAGES	2	
DATE OF INFO.	[REDACTED]	REQUIREMENT NO.	[REDACTED]	25X1A
PLACE ACQUIRED	[REDACTED]	REFERENCES		

THE SOURCE EVALUATIONS IN THIS REPORT ARE DEFINITIVE.
THE APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.
(FOR KEY SEE REVERSE)

25X1X

SOURCE:

1. The organization of the Ministry of Heavy Engineering was essentially the same as that of all the other ministries in the government. The basic units in the organization were the main administrations (hlavni sprava). Several main administrations were under each deputy minister.

2. The head of each main administration carried the title of Manager (reditel); he was responsible for the over-all operation of his main administration. On his staff there was a Chief Engineer, who supervised all the plants in a particular field and was responsible for the production of each. The Manager also had on his staff the following: planning officer, legal officer, finance officer, research officer, inspection officer, social officer, and others, whose titles [REDACTED] call. Some of these officers served two or more main administrations within the Ministry. [REDACTED]

25X1X

25X1X

3. The Ministry of Heavy Engineering maintained close connections with the Ministry of Domestic Trade, Ministry of Foreign Trade, and the State Planning Office through the main administrations. The main administrations in the Ministry of Foreign Trade had representatives attached to the foreign trade sections of the Ministry of Heavy Engineering; such close liaison was necessary because of the over-all planning program. Negotiations between the two ministries usually were carried on by the managers of the main administrations, their chief engineers, or other assistants, such as the planning officer. High policy matters were settled by the deputy ministers and/or the ministers themselves. The Ministry of State Control did not have any special representatives at the other ministries,

SECRET

723

SECRET/SECURITY INFORMATION

-2-

25X1A

but in the Ministry of State Control were officials charged with the "observation and inspection" of all other ministries. [REDACTED]

25X1X [REDACTED] these officials could send employees of the 25X1X Ministry to make on-the-spot inspections of industrial installations. Such cases were justified by failure to meet production quotas, suspected sabotage (such cases were later turned over to the StB for more thorough investigation), and probably discrepancies in handling funds. 25X1X

25X1X [REDACTED]

⁴
25X1X [REDACTED] production planning for industry was approaching consolidation in the State Planning Office. It may be said that production quotas were being filled approximately 100%. This does not mean, however, that there was widespread economic prosperity. It simply means that only as much production was being planned as industry could handle. Bad economic planning had resulted in shortages which had previously been satisfied by so-called spare-time production in plants. But this was changed, and such production under the Ministries of Industry also had to have the prior approval of the State Planning Office. The situation was different for the Ministries of Agriculture, Mining and Metallurgy, where the plan was fulfilled by only about 60%, because failure to meet industrial quotas was blamed ultimately on one of these two ministries.

SECRET